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Introduction
Over the last few years, the debate on labor market reform has been at the center of economic
policy debate in Argentina. This debate has been fueled by the sustained growth in the
unemployment rate observed during the decade. One of the major targets of the attack on labor
market regulation has been high dismissal costs.
Attempts to reduce dismissal costs for all existing jobs have faced strong opposition. As a
compromise, and to stimulate job creation, employment promotion contracts for new jobs were
introduced in 1995. These contracts are limited to a fixed term ranging from three months to two
years.
It is a standard view that the reform stimulated the creation of a large number of these
temporary contracts, which currently dominate the flow of new jobs. However, there is now a
growing concern about the volatility of these temporary jobs, referred to as junk contracts, and a
predominant view that they tend to generate excessive turnover. This paper studies the effect of
this reform on job duration.
Our main findings are that the reform generated an overall increase in the hazard rate, and
particularly so for the first three months of employment. During this period, the average hazard
rate increased by almost 40%.  For tenure above three months, the increase was on the order of
10%.
Recent Changes in Labor Market Legislation
During the 1990-1999 decade, there have been two major changes in labor market legislation.
These have not been major reforms, but rather they introduced flexibility  at the margin by
creating fixed term and temporary contracts that eliminate or reduce dismissal costs and labor
taxes.
The original law (1976) specified mandated severance payments equivalent to one month
of salary per year of seniority. Changes were introduced in December 1991 and March 1995.4
The 1991 Reform.  This reform introduced fixed term contracts and special training contracts for
young workers.
Fixed term contracts to promote employment were subject to the following terms:
•  Applicability restricted to workers who are registered in the national employment office as
unemployed or laid off as a consequence of government employment cutbacks.
•  Minimum duration: 6 months.  Minimum renewal period: 6 months. Maximum total
duration: 18 months.
•  Severance payment: If contract expires: ½ month of salary. If contract is terminated before
expiration: previous law applies.
•  Reduction in labor taxes: employer contributions reduced from 33% to less than 20%.
Fixed term contracts for new activity involved a somewhat different set of conditions:
•  Applicability restricted to new establishments or new lines of production or services in
existing establishements.
•  Minimum duration: 6 months. Minimum renewal period: 6 months. Maximum total duration:
24 months.
•  Severance payment: same as above.
•  Reduction in labor taxes: same as above.
The most distinct category consisted of training promotion contracts, which featured the
following conditions:
•  Applicability limited to workers less than 24 years old.
•  Duration varies from a minimum of 4 months to a maximum of 24 months.
•  Severance payment: none.
•  Labor taxes: none.
It appears that this reform did not have a great impact. The law required approval by
trade unions in order for these contracts to apply. The monthly flow of new employment
promotion contracts registered at the employment office (which was a requirement) totalled less
than 5,000 for the whole country.5
The 1995 Reform. This reform introduced a trial period for all contracts, special contracts to
promote the employment of certain age groups and a special regime for small firms.
The trial period provision introduced the following conditions:
•  Applicability to all new contracts.
•  Duration: 3 months.
•  No severance payments for terminations within this period.
•  Tax reduction for employee: from 20% to less than 8%.  Tax reduction for employer: from
33% to approximately 10%.
Special employment promotion contracts involved a somewhat .
•  Applicable to workers more than 40 years  old, not required to register in government
employment offices.
•  Minimum duration: 6 months. Minimum renewal period: 6 months. Maximum duration: 24
months.
•  Severance: No payment at termination of contract. Standard payment applies for early
termination.
•  Reduction in labor taxes: employer contributions reduced from 33%  to less than 20%
Training contract: Similar to previous law for unemployed workers between 14 and 25 years of
age.
In the case of small firms, the law establishes that these firms can use the employment
promotion contracts from the previous law (described above) with the following added
advantages:
•  No previous approval of the trade unions is required.
•  There is no need to register the contract in the government employment agency.
•  No severance payment.6
General Trends during the Period
The period considered has been marked by a sizable increase in unemployment rates, starting at
7% in the beginning of the decade, peaking in May 1995 at 17.5% and staying over 15% in the
most recent surveys. Though part of this increase is explained by an upward trend in
participation, most is accounted for by unemployment of  existing labor market participants.
Figure 1 gives an account of this evolution since 1993. As far as the business cycle is concerned,
fluctuations have been large in the period, averaging out to a 3.7% growth rate.  As seen in
Figure 2, the first two years of our study correspond to a big recession that is followed by three
years of high growth rates. A new sharp recession occurs in 1995, also followed by a period of
high growth.
Figures 3 and 4 provide standard estimates of creation and destruction flows for job
matches. The rate of match creation is measured by the ratio of employed workers with less than
one month (or 6 months) of tenure to the stock of employed workers. The rate of destruction is
measured by taking the ratio of unemployed workers with less than one month (or 6 months)
duration to the stock of employed workers.
These flows are fairly constant up to 1994. The severe recession in 1995 results in a large
shock to match destruction, which is then followed by a steady increase in creation. After 1995,
both flows stay at values at least 50% larger than those experienced during the first part of this
decade. The breakpoint (1995) is a recession year, but also the beginning of the new labor market
regime. In what follows, we attempt to identify the impact of this regime change.
The Sample
We use a linked panel of household survey data for the area of the Federal District and
surroundings (Gran Buenos Aires), which amounts to approximately 60% of total Argentina
employment. The survey is conducted every 6 months (April/May and October) with a 25%
rotation of the panel. As a consequence, each household can—in principle—be followed for two
years at intervals of six months. Our sample consists of the linked panels from May 1989 to
October 1998. There are a total of approximately 64,000 individuals in the sample, evenly
distributed throughout the years, of whom over 44,000 have multiple observations. Based on
these observations, our sample comprises a total of over 93,000 transition pairs. After restricting
the sample to those individuals between 21 and 65 years old, we are left with a total of7
approximately 71,000 transition pairs. Our conditional likelihood estimates consider only those
individuals with initial tenure under 5 years who are still in the labor force the following period.
This leaves a total of 14,854 transitions.
Variables Used
The variables considered were the following:
•  Personal characteristics: sex, age.
•  Job characteristics:
•  Type of employment: (salaried worker/self employed)
•  Size of firm
•  Benefits received (social security contributions, paid vacations, extra month supplement,
severance payment, and unemployment insurance.)
•  Duration of current job (if employed) or duration of unemployment spell (if
unemployed.)
We restrict our analysis to salaried employment, thus excluding the self-employed,
entrepreneurs or family workers, who are not subject to the above regulations.
Measuring the Effect of Regulation on Employment Duration
The 1995 reform provides a natural experiment that can be used to evaluate the impact of
changes in regulation. Overall, one might expect an increase in the flows into and out of
employment, as a consequence of the availability of short-term contracts, which we quantify
below. Given the three-month limit to temporary contracts, one might also expect to see a peak
in the hazard rates at this term. The special regime for small firms provides another source for a
natural experiment. In particular, one might expect a peak in the hazard rates for employment
termination may appear at the point of expiration of the employment promotion contracts (24
months), as well as at times of renewal (every 6 months.)8
Methodological Considerations
Stock Sampling vs. Flow Sampling
Our panel data allows us to compute conditional probabilities for transitions out of employment,
thus avoiding the problem of stock sampling. Correspondingly, our specification of hazard rates
allows for duration dependence.
Interval Censoring
The panel’s sampling plan presents the problem of interval censoring. Consider two consecutive
surveys, which take place at time t and t+ D, where D corresponds to the 6 months interval. The
survey provides information on the agent’s state of employment for each of these two periods
and the elapsed duration in that state. Let  sit  and sit+D denote the states and  dit and dit+D the
corresponding elapsed durations. Take a worker who is employed in the first survey with elapsed
duration d0. Three things may happen in the following interval: a) the worker is employed in the
same job with duration d1=d0+D; b) the worker is in a new job with duration d1< D; c) the worker
is unemployed where d1< D is the length of the current spell.
In cases (b) and (c), where a transition has occurred, it is impossible to determine exactly
when the initial job was terminated, since there could have been multiple transitions. However,
an upper bound for the duration of the first job is given by d0+D-d1, which would be exact if only
one transition had taken place.   The sample variation in d1 for these workers is thus informative
and contributes to identifying the underlying hazard rates. As usual, the observations from
workers in case (a) can be treated as right censored observations.
Measurement Error in Duration Data
As is well known, retrospective questions typically lead to significant reporting errors. In
recalling the length of a current or past spell, individuals typically round off their elapsed
duration. This gives rise to a common heaping problem where reports get concentrated at
particular duration lengths, such as 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, etc. This is illustrated in
Figures 5 and 6 that give, respectively, reported elapsed job tenure for employed workers and
completed tenure in the last job for those unemployed, corresponding to all salaried workers in
our sample. Unfortunately, some of these heaping times correspond to termination9
dates of certain contracts, making inference problematic. However, assuming that the distribution
for reporting errors has not changed over time, the effect of changes in the duration of specific
contracts can still be analyzed by looking at differences in hazard rates before and after the
reform.
A second source of problems comes from the ambiguity in the question used to calculate
job tenure for employed workers. The survey asks: “How long have you been in this
occupation?” Some respondents may interpret the occupation as a job description and not a
particular match. Measurement error of this type is quite dramatic in our data. If we define a
worker who has not changed jobs as one for which job tenure in the second interview exceeds 6
months, then if reports are correct in both intervals job tenure should have increased by 6 months
between the two surveys. Table 1 gives a distribution of the change in tenure for all workers,
those with tenure less than 1 year, and those with tenure less than 6 months. As seen, only 5.6%
of all matches (13.6% of those less than one year and 16% of those less than one month) satisfy
this criteria.  Notice that almost 24% of all reported changes in job tenure are negative (recall
that we are excluding new jobs.) and a similar amount report changes in tenure of over a year.
The degree of inconsistency is less for workers with lower duration. Furthermore, for workers in
this class, a large fraction hold new jobs (less than 6 months of tenure.)
Measurement error is probably less of a problem for identifying when an individual has
changed from one state to another (employment to unemployment or vice versa), for which there
is a specific question in the survey. The measurement error is more critical in attempting to
identify transitions within the same state, times of transition, and elapsed duration. Unless there
has been a change of state, we adopt the convention of defining as a new spell one where tenure
or unemployment duration in the second survey is less than or equal to 6 months.  If the survey
indicates a change of state and elapsed duration in the second state exceeds 6 months, we
consider this a change of state with censored time of change.10
Flows in and out of Employment
The panel data can be used to estimate total flows in and out of employment. The flows are
calculated by considering all employed workers in a given survey and observing their state in the
following survey period. The flow data thus constructed is pooled across all samples to compute
the mean transition probabilities. All calculations were done for salaried workers. Figure 7 gives
estimates corresponding to all transitions of employed workers into unemployment or a new job.
Total flows out of employment increased from approximately 10% at the beginning of our
sample period to over 15% at the end. Both components of the outflow have increased, though in
the last few years the growth comes mostly from changes to new jobs.
1  Similar conclusions
follow when considering transition flows for workers with short initial job tenure.
Figure 8 considers the flows out of unemployment. These have decreased during the
sample period, particularly dominated by lower probabilities of being employed after the six
month interval between surveys.
Table 2 gives hazard rates for total separation classified by initial job tenure and for years
prior to and after the 1995 reform. Most remarkably, these hazard rates exhibit a sharp increase
for workers in low tenure brackets. In contrast, for workers with initial tenure over six months,
there is no detectable change. This table also indicates that total separation rates are initially very
high and decrease rapidly with tenure.
Table 3 gives the fraction of employed workers in each tenure bracket that ended
unemployed in the following survey.  The patterns are quite similar, with large increases after the
reform for workers with initial tenure under three months. It is worth recalling that this duration
corresponds to the time limit of temporary contracts. Overall, the transitions to unemployment
are a small, but increasing fraction, of total separations. This could be the consequence of either
high quits into new jobs or high rates of escape from unemployment. Estimates of the multiple-
cycles model studied below indicate that the latter effect dominates.
Tables 4 through 9 provide decompositions of the previous two tables by age, benefits
and firm size. The following specific conclusions emerge:
                                               
1 It is worth recalling that, due to interval censoring, a transition to a new job may have involved a passage through
unemployment.11
1.  The increase in the hazard rate is larger for employees with no benefits. This may actually be
explained by the fact that workers on employment promotion contracts –such as the trial
period- do not get benefits. Indeed, as we will see later, the share of the flow out of
employment due to termination of temporary contracts increased significantly after the
reform.
2.  The hazard rates separations in low duration brackets increase more for the treatment groups
(small firms, workers less than 25 and over 40). The difference is somewhat less pronounced
when considering flows into unemployment. This suggests that workers in these targeted
groups may be experiencing a fast turnaround from unemployment.
Hazard Rate Estimation
This section gives details on the methodology used to estimate hazard rates.
Estimation
We construct a piecewise constant baseline hazard function. Consider a grid of durations {0 = t0
< t1 < ... < tJ }, and for j=1,…,J let Dj = tj  - tj-1  denote the length of each of the corresponding J
intervals. Hazard rates are assumed constant within each interval.
Let J(t) = max { j | tj  < t }, so that  tJ(t) £ t < tJ(t)+1.
Given vectors of covariates x=(x1 , x2) and parameters b=(b0, {bj }j=1,…,J ), the hazard rate
is given by:
            h(t;x,b) = g(x1, b0) hJ(t)(x2, bJ(t))
This is a hybrid model, where some covariates (x1) affect the hazard rate proportionately,
while the remaining covariates (x2) affect each segment separately. As an example, taking one of
the dummy variables to be the indicator of the years with temporary contracts, this formulation
allows us to study the effect these contracts had on different segments of the hazard rate.12
Given the above specification, the survival function S(t) satisfies:
Our data consists of employment spells that may have been completed or continued
between two consecutive interviews. For both types of spells, we have information on elapsed
duration at the time of the first interview, which we denote by t0 months. In case of incomplete
spells, elapsed duration in the second interval, t1 is given by t1 = t0 + 6, since the survey takes
place every six months. In case of complete spells, the information is limited due to interval
censoring. Letting d denote the duration of the new spell (either a new job or unemployment), all
we know is that t1˛[t0 , t0+6-d].
The conditional probability of a continuing spell, is given by  S(t0  +6)/S(t0) and the
conditional probability of a completed spell is given by  [S(t0)-S(t0 +6-d)]/S(t0). Letting I0 denote
the set of individuals with continuing spells and I1 those with completed spells, the likelihood
function is given by:
Note that by restricting our estimates to conditional probabilities, we circumvent the problems
associated to length bias sampling and non-stationarity of flows. This is also the reason why we
have not included in our estimates the information of the elapsed length of the second spell for
those individuals that completed the initial spell and were employed in a new job at the time of
the second interview.
The specification used for the hazard functions is log-linear, so g(x,b) = exp(b¢x) and
hj(x,bj) = exp((bj¢x).
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The following variables were included in the estimates:
Age Measured in years
Sex 0=female, 1=male
Sch1 Complete elementary school
Sch2 Incomplete high school
Sch3 Complete high school
Sch4 Incomplete college
Sch5 Completed college
Large firm Dummy for more than 50 employees
Benefits 0=no benefits,   1=some or all benefits
95-98 Dummy for years 95-98
Table 10 gives the mean hazard rates and survival function implied by our estimates.
Note that hazard rates are quite large during the first few months and fall rapidly thereafter.
Almost half of the jobs are terminated before three months and approximately one third reach
one year. At that point, hazard rates are very low.
Table 11 gives the maximum likelihood estimates. For each set of regressions there are
three columns giving, respectively, the parameter estimates, standard errors and risk ratios.
Naturally, the latter are only given for dummy variables. The demographic covariates are highly
significant and have similar values across the three specifications. Age decreases the hazard rate
at a rate of 1.3% per year. Male workers face a 20% higher risk of termination. Higher schooling
reduces the risk of job termination. In particular, college graduates have half the risk of those
workers with no complete elementary education. Employment in a large firm results in a mild
(but significant) reduction in this risk. Finally, workers with informal labor contracts (those
perceiving no benefits) have twice as high a risk of employment termination.
The first three columns correspond to estimates of a hazard function with two segments:
elapsed duration of less than three months and more than three months. Though it is plausible
that policy changes affect all the hazard function, the introduction of temporary contracts in 1995
is more likely to impact the first segment. Indeed, our estimates show this pattern: hazard rates14
for the first three months rise by almost 40% after 1995, while the overall increase for jobs with
longer tenure is around 10%. These parameters are estimated quite precisely, so this difference is
significant.
The second specification provides a larger set of duration intervals. After 1995, hazard
rates in the 1-3 months interval increase by more than 40%. For longer tenure brackets, the
increase is not monotonic. Most remarkably, in the 6-12 month segment the increase is also close
to 40%. However, this increase applies to a much lower base: For the average individual in the
sample, after 1995 hazard rates in the 1-3 month interval increase by 23 percentage points  (33%
to 46%), while for the 6-12 month interval the increase represents less than one percentage point
(2.3% to 3.2%).
The increase in hazard rates for  jobs  exeeding the three-month limit may seem
perplexing. However, there is an explanation.  Temporary contracts have two effects. On the one
hand, it allows firms to terminate bad matches more rapidly. This selection effect leads to a
decrease in hazard rates for the period following the end of a temporary contract. On the other
hand, temporary contracts reduce the cost of turnover and thus the cost of experimenting with
new matches. This can have a positive impact on overall hazard rates.
The third specification allows for the dummies of firm size and its interaction with 95-98
to affect selectively each segment of the hazard rate. This specification allows us to test the
impact of the special regime for small firms introduced in 1995. None of the coefficients for
these added variables turns out to be significant. Similar results were obtained when including
dummy variables for age groups interacted with 95-98 in each of the segments. Thus, the
evidence does not detect a signficant impact of the special regimes for small firms and young
workers.
Final Remarks
This paper analyzes the impact of the 1995 labor market in Argentina. Our results show that this
reform had a very strong impact on labor turnover, increasing hazard rates during the trial period
by 40%, without a compensating decrease for longer tenure. In contrast, the special regimes for
small firms and young workers show no sizable effects.
What is the economic significance of this response?  The policies implied lower taxes for
workers with temporary contracts, inducing an increase in hiring but also a substitution away15
from longer-term employment.  Evaluating the costs of this type of distortion is obviously an
important question. In addition, by reducing the cost of experiencing new matches, this policy
may have contributed to a better allocation of workers to firms. As indicated by the increase in
hazard rates for tenures beyond the limit of temporary contracts, firms seem to have reacted
positively to this incentive.
A complete evaluation of the costs and benefits of these policies would require
formulating and estimating a structural model of job matching. The results presented in this
paper suggest that research efforts in this direction can prove substantial.16
Table 1. Changes in Reported Tenure
All workers Tenure<1 year Tenure<6 months Change in
tenure % Cum. % % Cum % % Cum. %
Less than 0 23.7 23.7 1.7 1.7 0 0
0 22.7 46.4 8.0 9.7 0 0
1 0.2 46.6 0.8 10.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 47.1 1.9 12.5 1.1 1.6
3 0.6 47.7 2.3 14.8 1.5 3.1
4 1.2 48.8 4.8 19.6 4.6 7.7
5 1.3 50.1 6.1 25.7 7.1 14.8
6 5.6 55.7 13.6 39.4 16.0 30.9
7 1.1 56.8 5.1 44.5 8.8 39.7
8 0.9 57.6 3.8 48.3 6.3 46.0
9 0.8 58.4 3.6 51.9 6.5 52.4
10 0.7 59.1 2.8 54.7 4.5 56.9
11 0.5 59.6 2.4 57.1 4.2 61.1
12 16.3 75.9 10.7 67.9 1.7 62.817
Table 2.




















Hazard Rates for Total Separations
by AGE
years less than 25 25 - 40 more than 40
Before After Before After Before After
0-1m 64.0% 78.2% 48.0% 60.0% 40.3% 60.5%
1-3m 46.1% 50.8% 35.4% 42.9% 23.2% 41.6%
3-6m 31.9% 31.9% 22.0% 38.9% 22.4% 23.6%
6m-1y 27.4% 26.6% 19.5% 20.0% 15.9% 19.8%
1-2y 16.9% 14.8% 11.5% 13.6% 13.1% 11.8%
2-5y 11.3% 15.6% 8.5% 8.9% 8.4% 7.5%
Total 25.1% 28.3% 12.6% 15.4% 8.5% 10.5%
Table 5.
Hazard Rates of Involuntary Separations
by AGE
years less than 25 25 - 40 more than 40
Before After Before After Before After
0-1m 14.4% 30.7% 11.2% 16.9% 12.9% 20.9%
1-3m 15.0% 14.2% 5.7% 12.9% 7.1% 10.8%
3-6m 6.9% 6.6% 5.6% 10.6% 6.7% 6.4%
6m-1y 8.2% 6.0% 4.3% 5.6% 4.8% 9.6%
1-2y 2.3% 5.0% 2.2% 4.0% 5.4% 3.3%
2-5y 2.8% 4.7% 2.4% 3.2% 2.3% 2.9%
Total 4.7% 5.4% 3.0% 4.6% 2.6% 3.7%19
Table 6. Table 8.
Hazard Rates of Involuntary
Separations
by Social Benefits by Firm's Size
No Benefits All Benefits Small  firms Large firms
Before After Before After Before After Before After
0-1m 53.3% 68.7% 46.9% 48.3% 0-1m 51.0% 66.3% 58.7% 65.3%
1-3m 44.4% 48.9% 25.4% 38.2% 1-3m 39.0% 47.8% 31.5% 38.3%
3-6m 27.1% 39.5% 23.5% 20.9% 3-6m 24.4% 34.0% 28.0% 28.5%
6m-1y 24.3% 27.3% 16.1% 16.5% 6m-1y 21.7% 22.8% 19.4% 20.7%
1-2y 16.7% 19.9% 10.0% 7.3% 1-2y 14.5% 14.8% 10.8% 10.1%
2-5y 11.2% 12.3% 8.3% 7.8% 2-5y 9.4% 11.2% 8.3% 6.7%
Total 17.0% 22.9% 9.2% 8.6% 13.9% 17.7% 11.2% 11.0%20
Table 7. Table 9.
Hazard Rates of Involuntary
Separations
by Social Benefits by Firm's Size
No Benefits All Benefits Small  firms Large firms
Before After Before After Before After Before After
0-1m 12.7% 24.4% 10.2% 12.1% 0-1m 13.0% 23.2% 12.7% 20.4%
1-3m 10.9% 13.9% 8.5% 11.6% 1-3m 10.4% 12.8% 8.1% 13.0%
3-6m 7.1% 8.7% 5.9% 7.1% 3-6m 6.3% 8.8% 6.5% 6.0%
6m-1y 6.6% 8.3% 4.3% 5.5% 6m-1y 5.4% 6.5% 6.9% 8.0%
1-2y 4.1% 5.8% 1.8% 2.3% 1-2y 3.4% 4.7% 2.5% 2.8%
2-5y 2.5% 3.8% 2.8% 3.0% 2-5y 2.5% 4.2% 2.4% 1.7%
Total 2.1% 2.8% 2.6% 3.0% Total 3.5% 5.6% 3.4% 3.4%21
Table 10. Survival Function and Hazard Rate
Survival function Hazard rate (*)
1 months (**) 1 0.326
3 months 0.542 0.158
6 months 0.361 0.023
1 year 0.323 0.023
2 years 0.258 0.016
5 years 0.162 ---
Notes:
 (*) Hazard rates are monthly and constant in the interval defined by the given row and
the following one.
(**) Duration is reported by months, so the minimum reported in the sample is one
month.22
Table 11. Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Estimate S.E. Risk ratio Estimate S.E. Risk ratio Estimate S.E.
age -0.0128*** 0.00 -0.0121*** 0.0019 -0.0125***
sex  0.146*** 0.05 1.157  0.2066*** 0.0451 1.230  0.2038***
sch1 -0.108* 0.07 0.898 -0.1292** 0.0684 0.879 -0.1295**
sch2 -0.215** 0.08 0.807 -0.2029*** 0.0731 0.816 -0.2057***
sch3 -0.324*** 0.08 0.724 -0.3456*** 0.0782 0.708 -0.346***
sch4 -0.375*** 0.09 0.687 -0.457*** 0.0859 0.633 -0.4614***
sch5 -0.702*** 0.01 0.496 -0.7324*** 0.0972 0.481 -0.7345***
size -0.104*** 0.04 0.902 -0.128*** 0.0423 0.880
benefits -0.608*** 0.04 0.544 -0.528*** 0.0423 0.589 -0.5288***
1-3 months
constant -0.033 0.12 -0.4523*** 0.1294 -1.0716
95-98  0.327*** 0.07 1.386  0.3794*** 0.1048 1.461  0.4159
large firm -0.0616
large firm * 95-98 -0.1086
3-60 months
constant -3.007*** 0.11
95-98  0.107** 0.05 1.112
3-6 months
constant -1.0602*** 0.1225 -1.6054
95-98  0.1542* 0.0978 1.167  0.1376
large firm -0.2542
large firm * 95-98  0.014
6-12 months
constant -3.1055*** 0.1324 -3.676
95-98  0.3312*** 0.1175 1.393  0.2278
large firm -0.1929
large firm * 95-98  0.3311
12-24 monts
constant -2.9423*** 0.1173 -3.5802
95-98  0.0578 0.086 1.060  0.1272
large firm -0.0094
large firm * 95-98 -0.1926
24-60 months
constant -3.3049*** 0.1175 -3.9331
95-98  0.0908 0.0784 1.095  0.1487
large firm -0.0328
large firm * 95-98 -0.1549
Number of
observations
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Figure 8. Transitions from Unemployment
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